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Raymond Shih Ray Ku'
INTRODUCTION
Can an employer fire an employee based upon information gleaned from
Facebook or other social media? Should this information be protected as private
even when it is shared with "friends"? This Article explores how differences
between privacy law in the United States (US) and the European Union (EU)
highlight an important, if subtle, distinction between two competing conceptions
of privacy. The first treats autonomy as an aspect of privacy. The second treats
privacy as an aspect of autonomy. In other words, how, if at all, do the two legal
regimes protect an individual's personal information or what is often referred to as
"data privacy"? This Article argues that both legal regimes generally approach data
privacy protection by treating autonomy as an aspect of privacy. As such, privacy
law primarily focuses upon the individual's right to control the disclosure and
collection of information, and the debate surrounding privacy law revolves around
the circumstances in which privacy law should protect an individual's right to
consent to the collection and disclosure of information.
However, the EU also excludes certain classes of information from collection
and processing, such as race, ethnic origin, political opinion, or even sex life. This
exclusion provides an important complimentary approach in which data privacy is a
means of protecting individual autonomy and dignity. These provisions of EU
privacy law prevent employers from making decisions based upon certain categories
of information analogous to laws protecting individuals from discrimination. This
approach could and should be an important part of the data privacy debate in the
US. In addition to discussing the circumstances in data collection that are
permissible, the data privacy debate should also focus upon what categories of
information, if any, should be protected and under what circumstances should
decision makers be prevented from relying upon protected information.
This Article begins by discussing the recurring controversy surrounding
employers' employment decisions based upon information gleaned from an
employee's or a potential employee's social media accounts. These examples are
representative of the sometimes-troubling practice of schools, employers, and
others basing important decisions upon information gathered online. This Article
Professor of Law, Director, Center for Cyberspace Law & Policy, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law. I would like to thank the editors of the Kentucky Law Journal especially
Benjamin Monarch and Jeffrey Kaplan for the hard work and patience. The ideas expressed in this essay
were inspired by the works of numerous privacy scholars, including Daniel Solove, Julie Cohen, and
Alan Westin.
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then provides a brief description of data privacy laws in the US and the EU. This
discussion explains how these two sets of laws protect data privacy. The social
media problem is then considered through these laws and illustrates how, despite
their differences, both legal regimes focus upon protecting an individual's right to
control information about him or herself. Finally, the Article identifies an
alternative approach toward data protection that is closer to civil rights and anti-
discrimination laws than privacy. The social media example also demonstrates why
protecting data privacy requires protecting an individual's right to be free from
discrimination.
I. DATA PRIVACY: THE SOCIAL MEDIA PROBLEM
The growth in individuals using social media, as well as the growing ubiquity of
data about those individuals online in general, increasingly challenge the legitimacy
of individual expectations of privacy. By one measure, worldwide social media
usage will grow from just under one billion users in 2010 to a projected 2.44 billion
users in 2018.2 It is common for individuals using these services to share a wide
range of information, from nude images of themselves to their opinions on
political, philosophical, and religious questions. In some cases, this information is
shared with only one other or a small circle of confidants. However, a great deal of
information is shared with a much larger group of individuals, including coworkers,
employers, and even the public at large.
It should come as no surprise then that decision makers, including employers
and school admissions committees, gather and use this data when evaluating
prospective employees and students. However, individuals were in fact surprised to
find themselves fired because of Facebook posts or denied admission because of
something they tweeted. Cases demonstrating the negative consequences of social
media usage have been widely reported. Consider the following examples. A young
man posts a picture of himself smoking what appears to be an illegal substance. His
employer, a Facebook friend, fires him.4
2 See Number of Social Network Users Worldwide from 2010 to 2018, STATISTA,
http://www.statista.com/statistics/278414/number-of-worldwide-social-network-users/ (last visited Jan.
26, 2015).
See, e.g., Daniel Bean, 11 Brutal Reminders that You Can and Will Get Fired for What You Post
on Facebook, YAHOO! (May 6, 2014), https://www.yahoo.com/tech/11-brutal-reminders-that-you-
can-and-will-get-fired-for-84931050659.html; Jessica Holdman, Employees Fired for Facebook Post,
BISMARCK TRIBUNE (Sept. 9, 2013, 4:59 PM), http://bismarcktribune.com/business/local/employees-
fired-for-facebook-post/article 2117b7f8-199b-11e3-806d-00la4bcf887a.html; Heather Leigh, 4-
Year-Old Expelled from Preschool for Mom's Facebook Post, NEWS4JAX (Aug. 27, 2014, 11:22 PM),
http://www.news4jax.com/news/4yearold-expelled-from-preschool-for-moms-facebook-
post/27740108.
4 Bean, supra note 3.
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A woman is fired after complaining about her job and insulting her boss.s
A school teacher is fired for posting a picture of herself on vacation holding
alcoholic beverages. 6 Or, a school bus driver is fired after expressing his opinion
about the plight of a hungry child on his bus and offering to help "scrape up the
money."
5 Id.
7Id.
zol4-2o15] 393
A
394 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 103
Jo hny Cook
A Ll flustered this evenn.
A middle schooler got on my bus this evening and said mrjohnny im
hungry. I said why are you hungry buddy? Didn't you eat lunch ? He said no
sir I didn't have any money on my account. I said they would let you charge
it? No sit,
Sh WhaV This child is already on reduced lunch and we can't let him eat
Are you kidding me? rm certian there was leftover food thrown away today.
But kids were turned away because they didnt have .40 on there account .
As a tax payer, I would much rather feed a child than throw it away. I would
rather feed a child than to give food stamps to a crack head.
my number is the next time we cant feed a kid for forty cent.
please call me, We will scrape up the money.
This is what the world has come to
These examples are used as cautionary tales of the dangers of social media,
generating "dos" and "don'ts" of social media usage.' Some of the "don'ts" would
appear to be obvious: do not post evidence that you live "like a pre-rehab Lindsay
Lohan," or demonstrate that you are "getting chatty with the competition," for
example.' Other examples may come as a surprise, such as refraining from
expressing opinions on "politics, race, class, or gender" or bragging about your
"beautifil baby, boyfriend, or boat."'o
Given the growing recognition that important decisions may be based upon
information shared on social media, individuals have begun to "manage" their social
media identities. " And, consultants now offer professional advice on how to
manage that identity." Some go as far as offering to expunge your online identity."
While the way in which this information is shared and is gathered is clearly
new, arguably the "arbitrariness" or "unfairness" of such decisions is not new. For
example, in the United States, private employment is generally based upon the
principle of employment at will.14 Under this approach, employers may generally
refuse to hire or may decide to fire individuals for any reason. For example, an
employee may be fired for supporting a rival football team'5 or political candidate.'"
s See, e.g., Kathy Kristof, 6 Things You Should Never Reveal on Facebook, YAHOO! (Sept. 14,
2010, 3:00 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/pfarticle-110674.html; Amy Levin-Epstein,
Facebook & Your Job: 5 Ways to Get Fired, CBS NEWS (Mar. 16, 2011, 12:10 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/facebook-your-job-5-ways-to-get-fired/.
' Levin-Epstein, supra note 8.
o Id.
" See, e.g., Anna Vander Broek, Managing Your Online Identity, FORBES (June 2, 2009, 10:00
AM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/01/manage-online-reputation-technology-identity.html; Phyllis
Korkki, Is Your Online Identity Spoiling Your Chances?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/jobs/l0search.html?_r=0.
12 Mary Beth Moore, Dir. of Emp'r Outreach & Externships, Remarks at the Workshop on
Personal Branding and Social Media at Case Western Law School (Oct. 23, 2014) (during the writing
of this essay, the Career Development Office at Case Western organized a workshop on managing
students' online social identities).
1 See, e.g., REPUTATION.COM, http://www.reputation.com/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2015).
14 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 641 (10th ed. 2014).
I Kim Janssen, Packer Backer Fired for Wearing Green Bay Tie, SOUTHTOWN STAR (Sept. 24,
2012, 6:25 AM), http://southtownstar.chicagotribune.com/news/3476381-418/tie-stone-fired-bears-
packers.html.
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As such, employers are generally free to discriminate against individuals unless
specifically prohibited by certain laws, such as under anti-discrimination laws,
which prohibit them from discriminating based upon an individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or other protected categories.' 7
If the use of this information as the basis for decision-making should come as
no surprise, it should also come as no surprise that individuals have objected to this
use." The following Internet meme nicely illustrates these objections.
MY LIFE.
my CHoICEs.
MY; MISTA KES.
MY LESSONS.
Often, these objections are framed or interpreted in terms of individual
privacy." In other words, an employer, school, or other decision-maker should not
base their decisions on this information because it is (or should be) considered
private. Of course, the difficulty with this position is the fact that claiming
information you have already revealed to others is nonetheless private, smacks of
inconsistency. The remainder of this Article examines this objection beginning
with a comparison between data protection in the US and the EU.
6 Timothy Noah, Bumper Sticker Insubordination, CHATTERBOX (Sept. 14, 2004, 6:30 PM),
http://www.slate.com/artides/news-and~politics/chatterbox/2004/09/bumper.-sticker-insubordination.
html.
1 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
s Greg Fish & Timothy B. Lee, Employers, Get Outta My Facebook, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, http://www.businessweek.com/debateroom/archives/2010/12/employersgetoutta
my-facebook.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2015); Rachel Ryan, Yes, Employers Will Check Your Facebook
Before Offering You a job, HUFFINGTON POST (May 4, 2013, 5:12 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rachel/ryan/
hiringfacebook b_2795047.htm1.
9 See, e.g., Patricia Sanchez Abril, A (My)Space of One's Own: On Privacy and Online Social
Networks, 6 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73, 73-74 (2007); James Delaney, Employer Use of
Facebook and Online Social Networks to Discriminate Against Applicants for Employment and
Employees, 64 LAB. L.J. 86, 91-95 (2013); Saby Ghoshray, The Emerging Reality of Social Media:
Erosion of Individual Privacy Through Cyber-Vetting and Law's Inability to Catch Up, 12 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 551, 552-53 (2013).
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II. APPROACHES TOWARD PRIVACY IN THE US AND EU
In order to understand and evaluate the privacy claims posed by social media,
this section compares data privacy protection in the US and the EU. The purpose
of this discussion is not to provide an in-depth analysis of data privacy laws but to
illustrate how these two regimes approach the protection of information. As
discussed below, while both regimes focus upon protecting the individual's right to
control information, the EU supplements these protections with prohibitions
against the use of certain information such as political opinion or data concerning
one's sex life.
In the US, data or information privacy is not governed by a single statute. 20
Rather, information is protected on a case-by-case basis. For example, separate
statutes protect information regarding health information,2 ' driver licenses,22 and
even video rentals. 23 Varying common law causes of action also protect aspects of
privacy. 24 Government surveillance is covered by the Fourth Amendment, 25
communication interception statutes,26 and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act.21 However, the one unifying theme or underlying principle to privacy
protections in the United States is that the law protects only reasonable
expectations of privacy.
So when are expectations of privacy reasonable? The answer to this question
can be reduced to choice. Individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy until
they choose to make that information accessible to others. Courts have concluded
that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in information in plain view,2 8
including when private property can be viewed from the air,29 shared with third
parties,3 0 or contained or transmitted through an employer's property including
emails and telephone calls." As a common understanding of privacy might suggest,
information is private until the individual decides to share that information or acts
in a manner that makes the information available to others. Consequently, debates
about privacy focus largely upon the circumstances in which an individual can be
20 See DANIEL SOLOVE & PAUL SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 2-4 (2d ed.
2011).
21 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 1173, 110
Stat. 1936, 2024-26.
22 Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2012).
23 Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195.
24 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 198
(1890) (explaining the foundational work on the common law right of privacy); see also Neil M.
Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacys Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO.
L.J. 123, 126-27 (2007) (exemplifying more recent scholarship on this topic).25 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
26 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2012).
2 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783.
28 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-67 (1971).
29 Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
30 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
31 See Smyth v Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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said to have shared information or that information is accessible to others, but
nonetheless should be protected."
For example, in 2000, the Federal Trade Commission outlined four key
principles governing the fairness of information practices in the online marketplace.
Internet Data Collection is fair when these four prongs are met:
1. Notice-Web sites would be required to provide consumers clear and
conspicuous notice of their information practices, including what
information they collect, how they collect it (e.g., directly or through non-
obvious means such as cookies), how they use it, how they provide Choice,
Access, and Security to consumers, whether they disclose the information
collected to other entities, and whether other entities are collecting
information through the site.
2. Choice-Web sites would be required to offer consumers choices as to how
their personal identifying information is used beyond the use for which the
information was provided (e.g., to consummate a transaction). Such choice
would encompass both internal secondary uses (such as marketing back to
consumers) and external secondary uses (such as disclosing data to other
entities).
3. Access-Web sites would be required to offer consumers reasonable access
to the information a Web site has collected about them, including a
reasonable opportunity to review information and to correct inaccuracies or
delete information.
4. Security-Web sites would be required to take reasonable steps to protect
the security of the information they collect from consumers.3
Under this interpretation, individuals have a reasonable expectation in online
privacy when they have been made aware of the circumstances in which their
information will be collected and used, and they are given the opportunity to
choose whether they share that information. In other words, individuals lose any
reasonable expectation of privacy when they make the informed choice to share
that information.
Given the centrality of notice and choice, it should come as no surprise that in
the US, states have responded to the use of social media in employment decisions
by following those principles. Currently, to protect the individual's right to
determine when to share information, fourteen states limit an employer's ability to
demand access to an employee's social media. 34 These states, however, do not
3 See generally Richards & Solove, supra note 24.
3 3DIv. OF FIN. PRACTICES, FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION
PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE iii (2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practices-
electronic-marketplace-federal-trade-commission-report/privacy2000.pdf.
' See SEYFARTH SHAW, SOCIAL MEDIA PRIVACY LEGISLATION: DESKTOP REFERENCE 6-9
(2014), available at http://www.seyfarth.com/uploads/siteFiles/practices/131317SocialMediaSurveyM
13.pdf
2014-2015] 397
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
prohibit an employer from obtaining and relying upon publicly available
information.
The concept of informed choice is also central to data privacy in the EU. Unlike
the ad hoc approach followed in the US, the EU's Directive on Data Protection"s
provides a comprehensive set of legal principles for data privacy and requires
member states to implement those principles. For example, EU Directive 95/46
requires member states to guarantee that personal data is: "collected for specified,
explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible
with those purposes,"36 and that personal data may only be processed if "the data
subject has unambiguously given his consent."37
In response to the 95/46 Directive, the US negotiated various safe harbor
principles. US data collection will be considered consistent with the 95/46
Directive when:
Notice: An organization must inform individuals about the purposes for which it
collects and uses information about them, how to contact the organization with
any inquiries or complaints, the types of third parties to which it discloses the
information, and the choices and means the organization offers individuals for
limiting its use and disclosure. This notice must be provided in dear and
conspicuous language when individuals are first asked to provide personal
information to the organization or as soon thereafter as is practicable, but in any
event before the organization uses such information for a purpose other than that
for which it was originally collected or processed by the transferring organization
or discloses it for the first time to a third party(1).
Choice: An organization must offer individuals the opportunity to choose (opt
out) whether their personal information is (a) to be disclosed to a third party(1) or
(b) to be used for a purpose that is incompatible with the purpose(s) for which it
was originally collected or subsequently authorized by the individual. Individuals
must be provided with clear and conspicuous, readily available, and affordable
mechanisms to exercise choice.
For sensitive information (i.e. personal information specifying medical or health
conditions, racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical
beliefs, trade union membership or information specifying the sex life of the
individual), they must be given affirmative or explicit (opt in) choice if the
information is to be disclosed to a third party or used for a purpose other than
those for which it was originally collected or subsequently authorized by the
individual through the exercise of opt in choice. In any case, an organization
should treat as sensitive any information received from a third party where the
third party treats and identifies it as sensitive.
Onward Transfer: To disclose information to a third party, organizations must
apply the Notice and Choice Principles. Where an organization wishes to transfer
(summarizing state social medial protections); see also Michael Loatman, Social Media Privacy Bills
Facing More Scrutiny, BLOOMBERG BNA SOC. MEDIA BLOG (May 16, 2014),
http://www.bna.com/social-media-privacy-bl7179890555/.
s Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
* Id. art. 6(1)(b), at 40.
1 Id. art. 7(a).
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information to a third party that is acting as an agent, as described in the endnote,
it may do so if it first either ascertains that the third party subscribes to the
Principles or is subject to the Directive or another adequacy finding or enters into
a written agreement with such third party requiring that the third party provide at
least the same level of privacy protection as is required by the relevant Principles.
If the organization complies with these requirements, it shall not be held
responsible (unless the organization agrees otherwise) when a third party to which
it transfers such information processes it in a way contrary to any restrictions or
representations, unless the organization knew or should have known the third
party would process it in such a contrary way and the organization has not taken
reasonable steps to prevent or stop such processing.
Security: Organizations creating, maintaining, using or disseminating personal
information must take reasonable precautions to protect it from loss, misuse and
unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and destruction.
Data Integrity. Consistent with the Principles, personal information must be
relevant for the purposes for which it is to be used. An organization may not
process personal information in a way that is incompatible with the purposes for
which it has been collected or subsequently authorized by the individual. To the
extent necessary for those purposes, an organization should take reasonable steps
to ensure that data is reliable for its intended use, accurate, complete, and current.
Access: Individuals must have access to personal information about them that an
organization holds and be able to correct, amend, or delete that information
where it is inaccurate, except where the burden or expense of providing access
would be disproportionate to the risks to the individual's privacy in the case in
question, or where the rights of persons other than the individual would be
violated.
Enforcement: Effective privacy protection must include mechanisms for assuring
compliance with the Principles, recourse for individuals to whom the data relate
affected by non-compliance with the Principles, and consequences for the
organization when the Principles are not followed. At a minimum, such
mechanisms must include (a) readily available and affordable independent
recourse mechanisms by which each individual's complaints and disputes are
investigated and resolved by reference to the Principles and damages awarded
where the applicable law or private sector initiatives so provide; (b) follow up
procedures for verifying that the attestations and assertions businesses make about
their privacy practices are true and that privacy practices have been implemented
as presented; and (c) obligations to remedy problems arising out of failure to
comply with the Principles by organizations announcing their adherence to them
and consequences for such organizations. Sanctions must be sufficiently rigorous
to ensure compliance by organizations."
Accordingly, while the EU provides greater protection for the integrity of data,
individual access to data, and the requirement for enforcement of data protection,
informed consent through notice and choice can be considered the core principles
of EU data protection as well.
Conceptually, this approach toward data protection treats individual autonomy
as an aspect or element of privacy. While this element is critical, choice serves
" U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, EXPORT.GOV (July 21, 2000),
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg-main_018475.asp.
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privacy and not the other way around. Visually, the relationship between autonomy
and privacy would look like this:
Conceived in this manner, whether information is private, and therefore, legally
protected, is a function of the autonomous choice of the individual. In general,
when the individual exercises her autonomy by choosing to share information, she
no longer has a privacy interest in that information.
Given this conceptual approach and that data protection in both the US and
the EU turns upon principles of notice and choice, it should be no surprise that
claims that information shared on social media is private or that the use of this
information by others is unfair are met with skepticism. After all, individuals
knowingly share this information with others. They choose to make this
information available to others. In some cases, this may include having an employer
as a Facebook friend or tweets that are generally open to the public. As such, it
could be said that individuals "foolishly trade away their privacy to 'broadcast
themselves."'3 9 Nonetheless, a persistent unease and objection to decision making
based upon truthful information gleaned online remain. As the following section
argues, the EU Directive offers an alternative approach that evaluates the fairness
of these decisions based upon another relationship between privacy and autonomy.
III. DATA PROTECTION & ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
If objections to employers or other decision makers relying upon information
on social networks cannot be firmly grounded in terms of privacy, civil rights or
freedom from discrimination offers a complimentary paradigm. As this section
discusses, this approach is suggested by Directive 95/46 and is one consistent with
a model of privacy that recognizes privacy as an aspect of autonomy.
As discussed above, a popular objection to decision makers relying upon
information available online is the claim that this information is "none of your
" Abril, supra note 19, at 83.
[Vol. 1o34oo0
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business." While this can readily be considered an objection based upon privacy, it
is also a claim that the information should not be part of decision making even if
the information is not protected by a right of privacy. Once again, consider
Directive 95/46. While the US and EU both approach data protection through the
twin principles of notice and choice, the EU opens up the possibility of going one
important step further. Specifically, Directive 95/46 prohibits "the processing of
personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or
philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data
concerning health or sex life."40
Accordingly, the Directive recognizes that the use of certain categories of
information should be prohibited, and one might suggest that under Directive
95/46 an employer would be prohibited from making employment decisions based
upon this information. Such a conclusion would appear to give social media users
the remedy they seek. The Directive, however, recognizes two important
exceptions. First, the prohibition does not apply if the individual has given her
explicit consent unless the member state does not permit such consent.41 Second,
the prohibition may not apply "to data which are manifestly made public by the
data subject." 42 As such, it may not give prospective and current employees or
students the protections they desire.
However, because the Directive is implemented by member states and allows
for variation based upon the laws of the member state, it should come as no
surprise that there are differences in how these provisions have been interpreted.
For example, French law closely tracks the Directive and its exceptions,43 and as
such it may not provide any additional protections. In contrast, Spain protects an
individual's right to refuse to state "his ideology, religion or beliefs"4 4 and prohibits
the collection of data "for the sole purpose of storing personal data which reveal the
ideology, trade union membership, religion, beliefs, racial or ethnic origin or sex
life."45 With respect to personal data revealing "ideology, trade union membership,
religion and beliefs," Spain requires that this information may only be collected
"with the explicit and written consent of the data subject."46 Likewise, Italy restricts
the use of this "sensitive data" to circumstances in which the data is indispensable.4
4 Council Directive 95/46, supra note 35, art. 8(1), at 40.
41 Id. art. 8(2)(a).
42 Id. art. 8(2)(e), at 41.
4 Loi 2004-801 du 6 aott 2004 relative A la protection des personnes physiques Il'6gard des
traitements de donnies 1 caractare personnel et modifiant la loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative i
l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libert6s [Law 2004-801 of August 6, 2004 on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to Data Processing of Personal Data and Amending the Law 78-17 of January
6, 1978 Relating to Data, Files and Liberties], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RPUBLIQUE FRANGAISE
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETrE OF FRANCE], Aug. 7, 2004, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jopdf/common/jo-pdf.jsp?numJO=0&dateJO=200408078mnumTexte=2&
pageDebut=140638cpageFin=14077.
" Protection of Personal Data Law art. 7 ¶ 1 (B.O.E. 1999, 4390) (Spain).
45 Id. art. 7 ¶ 4.
4Id.art.7T2.
4 See Decreto Legislativo 30 giugno 2003, n. 196 (It.).
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While it remains to be seen whether differences in the implementation of Directive
95/46 will provide legal protections beyond those afforded by a right of privacy
premised upon notice and consent, it opens the door to treating data protection as a
civil right rather than a privacy right.
Instead of asking whether information is private, should we be asking when and
under what circumstances decision makers should be permitted to use information
available to them? Tracking Directive 95/46, instead of asking whether my racial or
ethnic origin should be protected as private, should we be asking how is my racial
or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or sex life
relevant to whether I will be a good student or employee? In this respect, the
objection that some information is "none of your business" is not so much an
objection to decision makers obtaining the information and thus intruding upon
one's private life so much as it is an argument that the information is not relevant.
In other words, "if it doesn't directly affect you, then it's probably none of your
business."48
Should objections to data gathering be treated as civil rights objections?
Consider a recent story reported in the New York Times about a prospective
college student. Apparently, while the student attended the college's information
session, she posted disparaging comments about other attendees, and because the
college tracked its social media coverage, it discovered her tweets.49 According to
the college, the student was denied admission based upon her credentials, but
according to the Dean of Admissions and Financial Aid, "had her credentials been
better, those indiscreet posts could have scuttled her chances."so Why would
someone's admission decision turn on her tweets? The Dean explained, "We would
have wondered about the judgment of someone who spends their time on their
mobile phone and makes such awful remarks."s'
Richard Posner argued that we should not recognize a right of privacy under
these circumstances because it would deny the decision maker important, relevant
information.52 To paraphrase Judge Posner, admitting a student in the absence of
this information would be akin to admitting a defective student, and the school
should be entitled to investigate the soundness of the applicant.s" One might tend
to agree with the outcome in the preceding example or with the outcome of earlier
examples, such as the employee smoking illegal drugs or skipping work to attend a
Halloween party. The same justification can be used to support perhaps more
troubling examples, such as the firing of the teacher who posted pictures of herself
with alcohol on Facebook, the bus driver expressing his frustration over a hungry
48 See Nisha Patel, 25 Famed Nosey People Quotes, SLODIVE, http://slodive.com/inspiration/
25-famed-nosey-people-quotes/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2015).
49 Natasha Singer, They Loved Your G.P.A. Then They Saw Your Tweets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
2013, at BU3.
so Id.
st Id.
52 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Privacy, REGULATION, May-June 1978, at
19-20.
" See id. at 21-22.
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child, or a student denied readmission to college because he had shared the fact
that he is gay with his friends on Facebook. In these later cases, was this
information relevant? Was it evidence that they were somehow "defective"
employees or students?
Even assuming these preceding examples could be considered evidence of poor
judgment, this issue still begs the question of whether such behavior necessarily
carries over into the classroom or workplace. Nevertheless, any assumption that
individual behavior under one set of circumstances is evidence of how that
individual will behave in other circumstances is inconsistent with our
understanding of human behavior.5 4 Individuals are capable of and do assume
different personae depending upon whether they are at home, with friends, or in
the workplace. This situational identity is not only common, but also arguably
necessary for human flourishing.
Viewed in these terms, autonomy is not an instrument of privacy evidenced by
individual decisions to share or withhold information, but rather privacy is an
instrument for protecting individual autonomy. Visually, this relationship would be
depicted as follows:
In other words, limiting the circumstances in which individuals may obtain
information about others allows those individuals to live a life of their choosing.
More importantly, recognizing privacy as an element of autonomy forces society to
recognize that concluding that the use of information is not a threat to individual
privacy is not the same as concluding that the use of information does not threaten
individual autonomy.
Much like the debates over the relevance of race or gender or any of the
categories of human traits we protect through anti-discrimination laws,
contemporary debate over data protection should focus upon identifying when
individual behavior (past or present) is relevant to the task at hand and when
judgments based upon behavior are misleading and inaccurate. However, instead of
5" See Abril, supra note 19, at 84-85.
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legal or constitutional debates involving which physical characteristics are irrelevant
or the circumstances in which individuals with those characteristics require
protection, this is a policy debate about the categories of information and the
circumstances in which that information is relevant, if at all.
CONCLUSION
While it is both important and fair for laws in the US and the EU to protect
the individual's right to be fully informed about the circumstances in which data
will be collected and used and to protect the individual's right to decide whether to
share that information, notice and choice are only part of the solution. As
illustrated by the privacy problems generated by the sharing and accessibility of
information through social media, privacy as defined by the individual's ability to
control personal information does not adequately capture the full range of data
protection interests. While the Directive of 95/46 suggests an important alternative
approach consistent with the civil rights paradigm, it may not go far enough.
Data protection laws must recognize that individual autonomy distilled as
individual choice is not simply a tool for protecting and defining the boundaries of
an individual's right to privacy. Instead, data protection laws should recognize that
the right of privacy is also a tool for protecting individual autonomy. Recognizing
privacy as an aspect of autonomy clarifies the interests that individuals using social
media are seeking to protect even when they share information online-certain
information about what I believe, what I have done, or what I am doing are not
relevant to decisions being made about me. While some of such claims can readily
be dismissed as unreasonable and self-serving, such as abusive behavior or illegal
conduct, others merit in-depth consideration. Why should a bus driver be fired for
expressing frustration for a passenger? Why should a student be denied admission
because he shared his sexual orientation on Facebook? Questions like these suggest
the need for broader discussions in the US and the EU on how decisions impacting
the lives of individuals should be made and what it means for individuals to be
judged on their merits.
Highlighting the differences between autonomy as privacy and privacy as
autonomy is not a suggestion that the two are separate or mutually inconsistent.
Both protect individual freedom and autonomy although through different legal
mechanisms. Anti-discrimination protections are useful remedies for preventing
overt discrimination. In contrast, privacy protections address subtle discrimination
and unconscious bias. Both approaches are required in order to fully protect
individual autonomy and freedom.
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